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The exclusionary rule
in historical perspective:
the struggle to make
the Fourth Amendment
more than 'an empty blessing'
by Yale Kamisar

nadopted
the 65the
years
since the rule,
Supreme
Court
exclusionary
few critics
have attacked it with as much vigor and on
as many fronts as did Judge Malcolm Wilkey
in his recent Judicaturearticle, "The exclusionary rule: why suppress valid evidence?"
(November 1978).
According to Judge Wilkey, there is virtually nothing good about the rule and a great
deal bad about it. He thinks the rule is partly
to blame for "the distressing rate of street
crimes" (page 215). He tells us that it "discourages internal disciplinary action by the
police themselves" (page 226); "actually results in encouraging highly pernicious police behavior" (e.g., perjury, harassment and
corruption) (page 226); "makes it virtually
impossible for any state, not only the federal
government, to experiment with any methods of controlling police" (page 227); and
"undermines the reputation of and destroys
the respect for the entire judicial system"
(page 223).
Judge Wilkey claims, too, that the rule
"dooms" "every scheme of gun control ...

to be totally ineffective in preventing the
habitual use of weapons in street crimes"
(page 224). Until we rid ourselves of this
rule, he argues, "the criminal can parade in
the streets with a great bulge in his pocket or
a submachine gun in a blanket under his
arm" and "laugh in the face of the officer
who might wish to search him for it" (page
225).
Unthinking, emotional attachment?
Why, then, has 'the rule survived? "The
greatest obstacle to replacing the exclusionary rule with a rational process," Judge
Wilkey maintains, is "the powerful, unthinking emotional attachment" to the rule
(page 217). If you put the issue to a representative group of lawyers and judges, he
concedes, "you would doubtless hear some
support" for the rule, but only from those
"heavily imbued with a mystique of the
exclusionary rule as of almost divine origin"
(page 223).
It is hard to believe that nothing more
substantial than "unthinking emotional at-
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tachment" or mystical veneration accounts
for support for the rule by Justices Holmes
and Brandeis (which I discussed in my
earlier article) and, more recently, by such
battlescarred veterans as Roger Traynor,
Earl Warren and Tom Clark.
In the beginning, Judge Traynor was not
attached to the rule, emotionally or otherwise. Indeed, in 1942 he wrote the opinion
of the California Supreme Court reaffirming
the admissibility of illegally-seized evidence.' But by 1955, it became apparent to
Traynor that illegally seized evidence "was
being offered and admitted as a routine
procedure" and "it became impossible to
ignore the corollary that illegal searches and
seizures were also a routine procedure, sub2
ject to no effective deterrent."[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other
discipline, law enforcement officers . . . casually
regard [illegal searches and seizures] as nothing
1. People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165, 124 P.2d 44

(1942).
2. Roger Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321, 322.

more than the performance of their ordinary

duties for which the City employs and pays
them.3
In light of these circumstances, Traynor
4
overruled the court's earlier decision.
And consider Earl Warren. During the 24
years he spent in state law enforcement work
in California (as deputy district attorney,
district attorney and attorney general), California admitted illegally seized evidence.
Indeed, Warren was the California Attorney
General who successfully urged Judge Traynor and his brethren to reaffirm that rule in
1942. In 1954, during his first year as Chief
Justice of the United States, he heard a case
involving police misconduct so outrageous
as to be "almost incredible if it were not
admitted" (the infamous Irvine case), but he
resisted the temptation to impose the exclu3. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d. 434,282 p.2d 905, 907
(1955) (Traynor, J.).
4. Roger Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts and LawAbiders, 31 MO.L.REv. 181, 201 (1966). See also
Monrad Paulsen, Criminal Law Administration: The
Zero Hour Was Coming, 53 CALIF. L.REv. 103, 107
(1965).

Why California adopted the rule
Roger Traynor was the chiefjustice of California in 1955 when the state supreme court
adopted the exclusionary rule. He explains
his position on the rule in this excerpt from
his article, "Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the
Fifty States" (1962 Duke L. J. 319, 322).
My misgivings about (the admissibility of illegally seized evidence) grew
as I observed that time after time it was
being offered and admitted as a routine
procedure .. .It was one thing to condone an occasional constable's blunder, to accept his illegally obtained
evidence so that the guilty would not
go free. It was quite another to condone
a steady course of illegal police procedures that deliberately and flagrantly
violated the Constitution of the United
States, as well as the state constitution.
Ah, but surely the guilty should still
not go free? However grave the ques-
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tion, it seemed improperly directed at
the exclusionary rule. The hard answer
is in the United States Constitution as
well as in state constitutions. They
make it clear that the guilty would go
free if the evidence necessary to convict could only have been obtained
illegally, just as they would go free if
such evidence were lacking because
the police had observed the constitutional restraints upon them.
It is seriously misleading, however,
to suggest that wholesale release of the
guilty is a consequence of the exclusionary rule. It is a large assumption
that the police have invariably exhausted the possibilities of obtaining evidence legally when they have relied
upon illegally obtained evidence. It is
more rational to assume the opposite
when the offer of illegally obtained
evidence becomes routine.
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sionary rule on the states, even in such
extreme cases. 5 It was not until 1961 that he
joined in the opinion for the Court in Mapp,
which imposed the rule on the states.
Chief Justice Warren knew the exclusionary rule's limitations as a tool of judicial
control, 6 but at the end of an extraordinary
public career-in which he had served more
years as a prosecutor than any other person
who has ascended to the Supreme CourtWarren observed:
[I]n our system, evidentiary rulings provide the
context in which the judicial process of inclusion
and exclusion approves some conduct as conporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling
admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the
conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary
7 rule withholds
the constitutional imprimatur.

and Irvine to stimulate any meaningful alternative to the exclusionary rule in the more
than 20 states that still admitted illegally
seized evidence at the time of Mapp. 10
I do not mean to suggest that Judge
Wilkey's views on the exclusionary rule are
aberrational among lawyers and judges;
many members of the bench and bar share
his deep distress with the rule. Indeed,
when Judge Wilkey asks us to abolish the
exclusionary rule now-without waiting for
a meaningful alternative to emerge-he but
follows the lead of Chief Justice Burger,
who recently maintained:
[T]he continued existence of the rule, as presently implemented, inhibits the development of rational alternatives ... It can no longer be assunmed that other branches of government will act
while judges cling to this Draconian, discredited
device in its present absolutist form."

The author of the Mapp opinion, Tom
Clark, was, of course, U.S. Attorney General
for four years before he became a Supreme
Court justice and he was assistant attorney
general in charge of the criminal division
before that. Evidently, nothing in his experience gave Clark reason to believe that the
rule had "handcuffed" federal officials or
would cripple state law enforcement. And
he never changed his views about the need
for the exclusionary rule during his 18 years
on the Court or the 10 years he spent in the
administration of justice following his retirement.8 Indeed, shortly before his death,
he warmly defended Mapp and Weeks. 9
Moreover, nothing in Justice Clark's career suggests that he endorsed Mapp out of
"sentimentality" or in awe of the "divine
origins" of the exclusionary rule. More likely, he was impressed with the failure of Wolf

Because so many share Judge Wilkey's
hostility to the exclusionary rule, it is important to examine and to evaluate Wilkey's
arguments at some length.12 Only then can
we determine whether the rule is as irrational and pernicious as he and other critics
maintain-and whether we can abolish it
before we have developed an alternative.

5. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954).
Perhaps he was confident that at least in such a flagrant
case the transgressing officers would be prosecuted or
otherwise disciplined. If so, his confidence was misplaced. See Comment, 7 STAN. L.REv. 76, 94n. 75

10. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 205, 224-25
(1960) (App.)
11. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 500
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
12. Though I discussed the empirical challenge to
the exclusionary rule in my first article, I do not
examine Judge Wilkey's use of empirical data in this
article because two political scientists-Bradley Canon
and Steven Schlesinger-will discuss that issue in

(1954).
6. See his opinion for the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), at 13-15.
7. Id. at 13.
8. See Larry Temple, Mr. Justice Clark: A Tribute, 5
AM. J. CRIM. L. 271, 272-73 (1977).
9. See Tom Clark, Some Notes on the Continuing
Life of the Fourth Amendment, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 275
(1977).

Crime and the rule
A year before the California Supreme Court
adopted the exclusionary rule on its ownand years before the "revolution" in American criminal procedure began-William H.
Parker, the Chief of the Los Angeles Police
Department, said:
[O]ur most accurate crime statistics indicate that
crime rates rise and fall on the tides of economic,
social, and political cycles with embarrassingly
little attention
to the most determined efforts of
13
our police.

Judicaturenext month.
13. William Parker, The Police Challenge in Our
Great Cities, Annals, Jan. 1954, pp. 5, 11-12.
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Almost as soon as the California Supreme
Court adopted the exclusionary rule,
though, Chief Parker began blaming the rule
for the high rate of crime in Los Angeles,
calling it "catastrophic as far as efficient law
enforcement is concerned," and insisting
"that the imposition of the exclusionary rule
has rendered the people powerless to adequately protect themselves against the crim14
inal army."'
Such criticism of the Cahan rule'- was
only a preview of the attack on Mapp. Chief
Justice Traynor, speaking about the debate
following the Mapp decision, rightly observed that: "Articulate comment about
[Mapp] ... was drowned out in the din
' 16
about handcuffing the police. "
Thus, it is not surprising that Judge
Wilkey would claim on his very first page
that "[we can see [the]huge social cost [of
Weeks and Mapp] most clearly in the distressing rate of street crimes ... which
flourish in no small degree simply because
of the exclusionary rule." Nevertheless, it is
disappointing to hear a critic repeat this
charge, because after 65 years of debate,
there was reason to hope that this criticism,
at least, would no longer be made. As Professor James Vorenberg pointed out, shortly
after he completed his two years of service
as Executive Director of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
What the Supreme Court does has practically no
effect on the amount of crime in this country, and
what the police do
has far less effect than is
17
generally realized.
Even Professor Dallin Oaks (now a university president), upon whose work Judge
Wilkey relies so heavily, advised a decade
ago:
The whole argument about the exclusionary
rule 'handcuffing' the police should be aban-

14. W. Parker, POLICE 117, 120-21, 114, 118 (0.
Wilson ed. 1957).
15. See, e.g., ABA, Summary of Proceedings of Section of Criminal Law 54, 58 (1956).
16. Traynor, supra n. 4, at 198.
17. James Vorenberg, Is the Court Handcuffing the
Cops?, N.Y. TIMES MAC., May 1, 1969, in CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 82. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, D.
Cressey ed. 1971.

doned. If this is a negative effect, then it is an
effect of the constitutional rules, not an effect of
the exclusionary rule as the means chosen for
their enforcement.
Police officials and prosecutors should stop
claiming that the exclusionary rule prevents effective law enforcement. In doing so they attribute far greater effect to the exclusionary rule than
the evidence warrants, and they are also in the
untenable position of urging that the sanction be
abolished so that they can continue to violate the
[constitutional] rules with impunity.' 8
A weak link
Over the years, I have written about the
impact of Cahan,Mapp and other decisions
on crime rates and police-prosecution efficiency. 19 1 will not restate my findings again,
especially since Judge Wilkey has presented
no statistical support for his assertion. I
would, however, like to summarize a few
points:
0 Long before the exclusionary rule became law in the states-indeed, long before
any of the procedural safeguards in the
federal Constitution was held applicable to
the states-invidious comparisons were
made between the rate of crime in our nation
and the incidence of crime in others.
Thus, in 1911, the distinguished expresident of Cornell University, Andrew D.
White, pointed out that, although London's
population was two million larger than New
York's, there were 10 times more murders in
New York. 20 And in 1920, Edwin W. Sims,
the first head of the Chicago Crime Commission, pointed out that "[dluring 1919 there
were more murders in Chicago (with a population of three million) than in the entire
British Isles (with a population of forty
18. Dallin Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U.CHI.L.REv. 665, 754 (1970).
19. See Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L.C.
&P.S. 171 (1962); Kamisar, On the Tactics of PoliceProsecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 436 (1964); Kamisar, How to Use, Abuseand Fight Back with-Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. L.
REV. 239 (1972).
See also Kamisar, When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed, " N.Y. TIMES MAC., Nov. 7, 1965, reprinted in A.
Niederhoffer & A. Blumberg, eds., THE AMBIVALENT
FORCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICE 319. Hinsdale,
II: Dryden Press, 2d ed. 1976; and in CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, D.
Cressey ed. 1971.
20. See 2 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 107 (1911).
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million)." 21 This history ought to raise some
doubts about the alleged causal link between the high rate of crime in America and
the exclusionary rule.
0 England and Wales have not experienced anything like the "revolution" in
American criminal procedure which began
at least as early as the 1961 Mapp case.
Nevertheless, from 1955-65 (a decade which
happened to be subjected to a most intensive
study), the number of indictable offenses
against the person in England and Wales
increased 162 percent. 22 How do opponents
of the exclusionary rule explain such increases in countries which did not suffer
from the wounds the Warren Court supposedly inflicted upon America?
* In the decade before Mapp, Maryland
admitted illegally seized evidence in all felony prosecutions; Virginia, in all cases. District of Columbia police, on the other hand,
were subject to both the exclusionary rule
and the McNabb-Mallory rule, a rule which
"hampered" no other police department
during this period.' 23 Nevertheless, during
this decade the felony rate per 100,000 population increased much more in the three
Virginia and Maryland suburbs of the Disin the District itself (a
trict (69 per cent) than
24
puny one per cent).
* The predictions and descriptions of
near-disaster in California law enforcement
which greeted the 1955 Cahan decision find
precious little empirical support. The percentage of narcotics convictions did drop
21.See 10 J. CRiM L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 327 (1919).
22. F.H. McClintock and N.H. Avison, CRIME IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 37 (1968). Of course, much of
the statistical increase in British crime may have been
an increase in reported crime, not actual crime. But the
same may be said for the statistical increase in American crime.
23. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957),
reaffirming McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943), excluded from federal prosecutions all confessions or admissions obtained during prolonged precommitment detention, regardless of whether they were
"voluntarily" made, so far as the record showed.
24. See Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM L. C. &
P.S. 171, 185 (1962).
During this same decade the national crime rate for
the seven major offenses rose 66 per cent and the overall
national crime rate soared 98 per cent. See id. at 184 &
n. 100.

almost 10 points (to 77 per cent), but only
possession cases were significantly affected.
Meanwhile, both the rate of arrests and
felony complaints filed for narcotics offenses actually increased! Thus, in 1959-60, 20
per cent more persons were convicted of
narcotics offenses in California superior
courts than in the record conviction percent25
age years before Cahan.
The overall felony conviction rate was
84.5 per cent for the three years before
Cahan, 85.4 per cent for the Cahan year and
86.4 per cent in the three years after Cahan
(even including the low narcotic percentages). 26 Conviction rates for murder, manslaughter, felony assault, rape, robbery and
burglary remained almost the same, though
the number of convicted felons rose steadily.

27

The exclusionary rule, to be sure, does
free some "guilty criminals" (as would an
effective tort remedy that inhibited the police from making illegal searches and seizures in the first place), but very rarely are
they robbers or murderers. Rather they are
"offenders caught in the everyday world
of police initiated vice and narcotics enforcement..."
Though critics of the exclusionary rule sometimes sound as though it constitutes the main
loophole in the administration of justice, the fact
is that it is only a minor escape route in a system
that filters out far more offenders through police,
prosecutorial, and judicial discretion than it tries,
convicts and sentences ...
Moreover, the critics' concentration on the formal issue of conviction tends to overlook the very
real sanctions that are imposed even on defendants who 'escape' via the suppression of evidence
[e.g., among the poor, most suffer at least several
days of imprisonment, regardless of the ultimate
verdict; many lose their jobs as a result and have
a hard time finding another] ...
When one considers that many convictions in
the courts that deal with large numbers of motions to suppress often amount to small fines,
suspended sentences, and probation, the distincand escape becomes
tion between conviction
even more blurred. 28
25. See Kamisar, On the Tactics of PoliceProsecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CoRNELL L.Q. 437, 463 (1964).
26. Id. at 464.
27. See Kamisar, supra n. 24 at 190.
28. Critique, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740, 774-76 (1975).
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Guns and the exclusionary rule
Judge Wilkey does advance what so far as I
know is a new argument: that gun control
will be totally ineffective "so long as the
exclusionary rule hampers the police in enforcing it." "Since [American] criminals
know the difficulties of the police in making
a valid search," he observes, "the criminals
in America do carry guns," unlike criminals
in England and other countries.
Why, then, did so many criminals carry
guns in New York and more than 20 other
states that admitted illegally seized evidence
until 1961? New York, for example, passed
the Sullivan Act in 1911, making the ownership and carrying of pistols subject to a
police permit. But a British gun control
expert said recently that, if we compare New
York with London in the 10 years after
passage of the Sullivan Act, we would probably find
that New York, with its strict controls on the
private ownership of pistols, suffered infinitely
more from the crininal use of firearms of all types
than did London in a29 period when all firearms
were freely available.
Evidently, short of abolishing the exclusionary rule across the board, Judge Wilkey
would welcome an amendment to the
Fourth Amendment that read something like
this:
The guaranty against unreasonable search and
seizure shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any crininal proceeding any dangerous
weapon seized by a peace officer outside the
curtilage of any dwelling house.
It may be surprising, but the 1963 Michigan Constitution (as well as its predecessor)
contained just such a provision. Whenever it
was challenged after Mapp, the Michigan
Supreme Court managed to avoid invalidating it by finding that the search in question
had been reasonably conducted. 30 In the
29. Colin

Greenwood,

FIREARMS

CONTROL:

A

STUDY OF ARMED CRIME ANI) FIREARMS CONTROL IN

AND WALES 3-4 (Introduction). London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1972.
30. See Edward Wise, Criminal Law atid Procedure,
1971 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 17 WAYNE
L.REv. 381-83 (1971).
ENGLAND
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1966 Blessing case, only two of the seven
state court justices said the proviso violated
the U.S. Constitution.3 ' Most state judges
thought that, despite Mapp, the Blessing
case had upheld the "anti-exclusionary"
proviso 32; as late as 1969, a unanimous
panel of the court of appeals acted on this
33
basis.
Thus, for nine years after Mapp the police
of Michigan were free to search suspects for
weapons for almost any reason. What happened? In six years, starting in 1964, criminal homicides in Detroit more than tripled, rising from 138 to 488. 3 4 Why? Judge
(and former Detroit Police Commissioner)
George Edwards quotes the head of the
Detroit Police Department's Homicide Bureau:
There are more homicides in the city because
there are more handguns in the city. The relationship is that clear. You can't go by the increase in
[gun] registration either. The bulk of handguns
used in violent crime are not registered. :5'
The National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence likewise determined that handguns had caused the upsurge in crime:
Between 1965 and 1968, homicides in Detroit
committed with firearms increased 400 per cent
while homicides committed with other weapons
increased only 30 per cent; firearms robberies
increased twice as fast as robberies committed
without firearms. (These rates of increase are
much higher than for the nation as a whole).:36
31. People v. Blessing, 378 Mich. 51, 142 N.W.2d
709 (1966). See also Wise, CriminalLaw and Evidence,
1966 Anmal Strvey of Michigan Law, 13 WAYNE
L.REV. 114, 133-36 (1966).
32. See Wise, supra n. 30 at 382-83.
33. People v. Pennington, 17 Mich. App. 398, N.W.
2c (1969), rev'd 383 Mich. 611, N.W.2d (1970).
34. See Edwards, Commentary: Mnrder and Cnm
Control, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1972).
35. Id. at 1341. "[A] sample of 113 handguns confiscated by police during shootings in the City of Detroit
(luring 1968 showed that only 25 per cent of the
confiscated weapons had been recorded previously in
connection with a gun permit application." G. Newton
and Franklin Zimring, Staff Report to the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
in America, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
LIFE

36.

51 (1969).
NATIONAL COMMISSION

ON THE

CAUSES AND

PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE,
To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 171 (1969).
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An undemonstrated connection
The availability of handguns clearly increases crime rates, but do changes in the
rules of evidence? Judge Wilkey hints darkly that there is a "connection" between
America's high crime rate and its "unique"
exclusionary rule. So far as I am aware, no
one has been able to demonstrate such a
connection on the basis of the annual Uniform Crime Reports or any other statistical
data. In Michigan, for example, the rate of
violent crime seems to have fluctuated without regard to the life and death of the state's
"anti-exclusionary" proviso.
From 1960-64, the robbery rate increased
only slightly in the Detroit Metropolitan
Statistical Area but it quadrupled from 1964
37
to 1970 (from 152.5 per 100,000 to 648.5).
When the Michigan Supreme Court struck
down the state's "anti-exclusionary" proviso
in 1970,38 the robbery rate fell (to 470.3 per
100,000 in 1973), climbed (to 604.2 in 1975),
then dropped again (to 454.3 in 1977, the
lowest it has been since the 1960's).
From 1960-64, the murder and nonnegligent manslaughter rate remained almost the
same in the Detroit area, but it rose extraordinarily the next six years (5.0 in 1964 to
14.7 in 1970). In the next four years it
continued to climb (but less sharply) to 20.2
in 1974. Then it dropped to 14.1 in 1977, the
lowest it has been since the 1960's.
Finally, I must take issue with Judge
Wilkey's case of the criminal who "parade[s] in the streets with a great bulge in his
pocket or a submachine gun in a blanket
under his arm," "laugh[ing] in the face of
the officer who might wish to search him for
it" (page 225). If American criminals "know
the difficulties of the police in making a
valid search," as Judge Wilkey tells us, they
know, too, that the exclusionary rule has
"virtually no applicability" in "large areas

of police activity which do not result in
criminal prosecutions" 39 and that confiscation of weapons is one of them. 40 (The
criminal might get back his blanket, but not
the submachine gun).
Moreover, it is not at all clear that an
officer who notices a "great bulge" in a
person's pocket or, as in the recent Mimms
case,41 a "large bulge" under a person's
sports jacket, lacks lawful authority to conduct a limited search for weapons. Indeed,
Mimms seems to say that a policeman does
have the authority under such circumstances. 42 Even if I am wrong, however, even if
the Fourth Amendment does not permit an
officer to make such a limited search for
weapons, abolishing the exclusionary rule
wouldn't change that. If an officer now lacks
the lawful authority to conduct a "frisk"
under these circumstances, he would still
lack the lawful authority to do so if the rule
were abolished. This is a basic point, one
that I shall focus on in the next section.
A basic confusion
In my earlier Judicature article, I pointed
out how police and prosecutors have treated
the exclusionary rule as if it were itself the
guaranty against unreasonable search and
seizure (which is one good reason for retaining the rule). At several places Judge
Wilkey's article reflects the same confusion.
He complains, for example, that if a search
or frisk turns up a deadly weapon, that
weapon cannot be used in evidence if the
officer lacked the constitutionally required
cause for making the search or frisk in the
first place (page 224). But this is really an
attack on the constitutional guaranty itself,
not the exclusionary rule. Prohibiting the
use of illegally seized evidence may be poor
39. Burger, C.J., dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418

(1971).
37. All the data in this paragraph and the next are

based on the FBI

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

for the

years 1960 through 1977 (the latest year available).
The FBI reports crime nationally, by region, by state
and by "standard metropolitan statistical area." The
Detroit area includes five adjoining counties. From
1960-1977, the statewide homicide and robbery fluctuations were consistent with the Detroit area's.
38. People v. Pennington, 383 Mich. 611, 178 N.W.
2d 471 (1970).

40. See Jerome Skolnick,

JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL:

SOCIETY 220.
London: John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 1975. Cf. F. Miller,
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC

PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME 247-48 (confiscation of automobiles).

Boston: Little, Brown & Co., F. Remington ed. 1969.
41. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977)
(per curiam). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
42. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12
(1977) ( per curiam).
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"public relations" because by then we know
who the criminal is, 43 but an after-the-fact
prohibition
prevents convictions in no greater degree than
would effective prior direction to police to search
only by legal means ... [T]he maintenance of
existing standards by means of exclusion is not
open to attack unless it can be doubted 44whether
the standards themselves are necessary.
If we replace the exclusionary rule with
"disciplinary punishment and civil penalties directly against the erring officer involved," as Judge Wilkey proposes (page
231), and if these alternatives "would certainly provide a far more effective deterrent
than . . . the exclusionary rule," as the judge
assures us (page 231), the weapon still
would not be brought in as evidence in the
case he poses because the officer would not
make the search or frisk if he lacked the
requisite cause to do so.
Judge Wilkey points enviously to England, where "the criminals know that the
police have a right to search them on the
slightest suspicion, and they know that if a
weapon is found they will be prosecuted"
(page 225, emphasis added). But what is the
relevance of this point in an article discussing the exclusionary rule and its alternatives? Abolishing the rule would not confer
a right on our police to search "on the
slightest suspicion"; it would not affect lawful police practices in any way. Only a
change in the substantive law of search and
seizure can do that. (See the accompanying
insert, "Liberalizing the law of search and
seizure: a separate issue.") And replacing
the exclusionary rule with a statutory remedy against the government would not bring
about an increase in unlawful police activity
if the alternative were equally effectiveand Judge Wilkey expects it to be "a far
more effective deterrent."
I venture to say that Judge Wilkey has
43. See J. Kaplan, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1978.
44. Note, 58 YALE L.J. 161-62 (1948). (Emphasis
added.) See also Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and
Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.

225-26, in

POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

87-88. Chicago: Aldine, Sowle ed. 1962.
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confused the content of the law of search
seizure (which proponents of the exclusionary rule need not, and have not always,
defended, as the accompanying insert
shows) with the exclusionary rule-which
"merely states the consequences of
a breach
of whatever principles might be adopted to
control law enforcement officers." 45 The
confusion was pointed out more than 50
years ago by one who had the temerity
to reply to the great Wigmore's famous
criticism of the rule. 46 Every student of
the problem knows Wigmore's views on
this subject, but very few are familiar
with Connor Hall's reply. It is worth
recalling:
When it is proposed to secure the citizen his
constitutional rights by the direct punishment of
the violating officer, we must assume that the
proposer is honest, and that he would have such
consistent prosecution and such heavy punishment of the offending officer as would cause
violations to cease and thus put a stop to the
seizure of papers and other tangible evidence
through unlawful search.
If this, then, is to be the result, no evidence in
any appreciable number of cases would be obtained through unlawful searches, and the result
would be the same, so far as the conviction of
criminals goes, as if the constitutional right was
enforced by a return of the evidence.
Then why such anger in celestial breasts? Justice can be rendered inefficient and the criminal
classes coddled by the rule laid down in Weeks
only upon the assumption that the officer will not
be directly punished, but that the court will
receive the fruits of his lawful acts, will do no
more than denounce and threaten him with jail or
the penitentiary and, at the same time, with its
tongue in its cheek, give him to understand how
fearful a thing it is to violate the Constitution.
This has been the result previous to the rule
adopted by the Supreme Court, and that is what
the courts are asked to continue.
...If punishment of the officer is effective to
prevent unlawful searches, then equally by this is
justice rendered inefficient and criminals coddled. It is only by violations
that the great god
47
Efficiency can thrive.
45. Paulsen, supra n. 44, at 87.
46. John Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Ille-

gal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
47. C. Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment, 8
A.B.A.J. 646 (1922). See also insert at p. 338, supra;

Francis Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure,
Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1,
19-20; Paulsen, supra n. 4, at 88.
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Waiting for alternatives
Judge Wilkey makes plain his agreement
with Chief Justice Burger that "the continued existence of [the exclusionary rule] ...
inhibits the development of rational alternatives" and that "incentives for developing
new procedures or remedies will remain
minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary rule is retained in its present
form ."48
48. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 500 (1976)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). Earlier, the Chief Justice had
balked at abandoning the exclusionary rule "until some
meaningful alternative can be developed" because "a
flat overruling" of Weeks and Mapp might give law
enforcement officials "the impression, however erroneous, that all constitutional restraints on police had
somehow been removed-that an open season on 'criminals' had been declared." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 420-21
(1971) (dissenting).

Thus, Judge Wilkey warns that "we will
never have any alternative in operation until
the rule is abolished. So long as we keep the
rule, the police are not going to investigate
and discipline their men, and thus sabotage
prosecutions by invalidating the admissibility of vital evidence . . ." (pages 217-18). He
argues that Mapp "removed from the states
both the incentive and the opportunity to
deal with illegal search and seizure by
means other than suppression" (page 227).
And he concludes his first article with these
words:
[Let us . . . by abolishing the rule permit in the
laboratories of our fifty-one jurisdictions the experimentation with the various possible alternatives promising far more than the now discredited exclusionary rule.

Liberalizing the law of
search and seizure: a separate issue
As Professor (now Dean) Monrad Paulsen
has noted, and as his own writings illustrate,
supporters of the exclusionary rule need not,
and have not always, defended the content
of the law of search and seizure. Thus, more
than 20 years ago, Paulsen maintained that
in several respects the law of search and
seizure was "too restrictive of police work
and ought to be liberalized." '1 I share his
view that if the substantive rules of search
and seizure "make sense in the light of a
policeman's task, we will be in a stronger
2
position to insist that he obey them."
In the early 1960's, Professor Fred Inbau
criticized the Court for handing down Mapp
v. Ohio, warning state prosecutors "You'll
experience some real jolts" if such federal
doctrines as the ban against seizing items of
"evidentiary value only" (first articulated in
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 3093
11 [1921]) "are applied to your own cases."
1. Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 66 (1957).
2. id.

3. Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties:
The Prosecutor's Stand 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 85, 87
(1962) (keynote address at 1961 annual meeting of
National District Attorney's Association).

In my response, I said that the Gouled rule
(which put objects of "evidentiary value
only" beyond the reach of the police even
when they act on the basis of "probable
cause" or pursuant to an otherwise valid
warrant) "is unsound and undesirable...
[It] is wrong because it departs from the
fundamental principles pervading search
4
and seizure law."If the Fourth Amendment had indeed
carved out a "zone" that the police could
never enter, abolition of the exclusionary
rule, either across the board or along this
particular front, would not have authorized
the police to enter the zone. The proper
response, if criticism of the Gouled rule was
valid (and it was), was not to overrule Mapp
or Weeks but to abolish the Gouled rule0
which the Court subsequently did.5
-Y.K.
4. Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties:
Some "Facts" and "Theories,"53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
171, 177 (1962).
5. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Brennan, J.) (Distinction between "mere evidence" and
instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband finds no
support in Fourth Amendment). See also Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 & n. 2 (1967).
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In light of our history, these comments
(both the Chief Justice's and Judge
Wilkey's) are simply baffling. First, the fear
of "sabotaging" prosecutions has never inhibited law enforcement administrators
from disciplining officers for committing the
"many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up
nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is
made, about which courts do nothing, and
49
about which we never hear."
Second, both defenders of the rule and its
critics recognize that
there are large areas of police activity which do
not result in criminal prosecutions [e.g., arrest
or confiscation as a punitive sanction, (common
in gambling and liquor law violations), illegal
detentions which do not result in the acquisition of evidence, unnecessary destruction of
property]-h6nce the rule has virtually no applicability and no effect in such situations."0
Whatever the reason for the failure to discipline officers for "mistakes" in these "large
areas of police activities," it cannot be the
existence of the exclusionary rule.
Finally, and most importantly, for many
decades a majority of the states had no
exclusionary rule but none of them developed any meaningful alternative. Thirty-five
years passed between the time the federal
courts adopted the exclusionary rule and the.
time Wolf was decided in 1949, but none of
the 31 states which still admitted illegally
seized evidence5 1 had established an alternative method of controlling the police.
Twelve more years passed before Mapp imposed the rule on the state courts, but none
of the 24 states which still rejected the exclusionary rule 52 had instituted an alternative
remedy. This half-century of post-Weeks
"freedom to experiment" did not produce
any meaningful alternative to the exclusionary rule anywhere.
49. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949)
(Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter and Murphy, JJ.
dissenting) (self-styled prologue). But cf. Jackson, J., in
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1954).
50. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
51. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29, 38 (1949).
52. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 205, 224-25

(1960).
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Disparity between fact and theory
Of course, few critics of the exclusionary
rule have failed to suggest alternative remedies that might be devised or that warranted
study. None of them has become a reality.
In 1922, for example, Dean Wigmore
maintained that "the natural way to do justice" would be to enforce the Fourth
Amendment directly "by sending for the
high-handed, over-zealous marshal who had
searched without a warrant, imposing a 30day imprisonment for his contempt of the
Constitution, and then preceeding to affirm
the sentence of the convicted criminal." 53
Nothing ever came of that proposal. Another
critic of the rule suggested that a civil rights
office be established, independent of the
regular prosecutor, "charged solely with the
responsibility of investigating and prosecuting alleged violations of the Constitution by
law-enforcement officials.5 4 Nothing came
of that proposal either.
Judge Wilkey recognizes that "policemen
traditionally are not wealthy," but "[t]he
government has a deep purse." Thus, as did
55
Chief Justice Burger in his Bivens dissent,
Judge Wilkey proposes that in lieu of the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence there
be a statutory remedy against the government itself to afford meaningful compensation and restitution for the victims of police
illegality. Two leading commentators, Caleb
Foote and Edward Barrett, Jr. made the
same suggestion 20 years ago, 56 but none of
the many states that admitted illegally
seized evidence at the time seemed interested in experimenting along these lines.
Indeed, the need for, and the desirability
53. Wigmore, supra n. 46, at 484. To the same effect

is 8 Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2184, at 40 (3d ed. 1940). But
see Hall, supra n. 47, at 647, doubting "whether the
marshal would ever be compelled to live upon jail
fare."

54. Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 N. U.L.REv. 46, 62 (1957). The disadvantages of this proposal are discussed in Paulsen, supra n. 44,
at 94.
55. Biven vs. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 422-23 (1971).
56. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN.L.REv. 493 (1955). Barrett,
Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A
Comment on People vs. Cahan,43 CALIF. L.REv. 565,
592-95 (1955).
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of, a statutory remedy against the government itself was pointed out at least as long
ago as 1936. In a famous article published
that year, Jerome Hall noted that the prospects of satisfying a judgment against a
police officer were so poor that the tort
remedy in the books "collapses at its initial
application to fact." Said Hall:
[W]here there is liability (as in the case of the
policeman), the fact of financial irresponsibility
is operative and, presumably, conclusive; while,
where financial responsibility exists
(as in the
57
case of a city), there is no liability.
"This disparity between theory and fact,
between an empty shell of relief and substantial compensation," observed Professor
Hall-43 years ago-"could not remain unnoticed."518

This disparity-no longer unnoticed, but
still uncorrected-has troubled even the
strongest critics of the rule. Thus, more than
35 years ago, J.A.C. Grant suggested "implement[ing]the law covering actions for trespass, even going so far as to hold the government liable in damages for the torts of its
agents.5 9 And, William Plumb, Jr., accompanied his powerful attack on the rule with a
60
similar suggestion.
Mapp's traumatic effects
At the time of Plumb's article, the admissibility of illegally-seized evidence had "once
more become a burning question in New
York." 61 Delegates to the 1938 constitutional convention had defeated an effort to write
the exclusionary rule into the constitution,
but only after a long and bitter debate. 62 The
battle then moved to the legislature, where
bills were pending to exclude illegally obtained, or at least illegally wiretapped, evi63
dence.
57. Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to
Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U.CHI. L.REv. 345,
346 (1936).
58. Id. at 348.
59. J.A.C. Grant, Search and Seizure in California,15
SO. CALIF. L.REv. 139, 154 (1942).
60. William Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law,

24

L. Q. 337, 387 (1939).
61. Id. at 349.
62. 1 NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
Revised Record 358-594 (1938).
63. Plumb, supra n. 60, at 349 n. 40 and 357 n. 94.
CORNELL

Against this background, Plumb offered a
64
whole basketful of alternatives to the rule
and he said the state legislature "should
make a thorough study of the problem of
devising effective direct remedies [such as
those he had outlined] to make the constitutional guarantee 'a real, not an empty blessing."' 65 But nothing happened.
Otherwise why would a New York City
Police Commissioner say of Mapp some 20
years later:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the
field of law enforcement which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as this . . . I was immediately caught up in the entire problem of
reevaluating our procedures which had followed
the Defore rule, and modifying, amending, and
creating new policies and new instructions for
the implementation of Mapp. The problems were
manifold. [Supreme Court decisions such as
Mapp] create tidal waves and earthquakes which
require rebuilding of our institutions sometimes
from their very foundations upward. Retraining
sessions had to be held from the very top administrators down to each of the thousands of foot
patrolmen...

66

In theory, Defore,67 which rejected the
exclusionary rule in New York, had not
expanded lawful police powers one iota.
Nor, in- theory, had Mapp reduced these
powers. What was an illegal search before
Defore was still an illegal search. What was
an unlawful arrest before Mapp was still an
unlawful arrest.
The Defore rule, of course, was based
largely upon the premise that New York did
not need to adopt the exclusionary rule because existing remedies were adequate to
effectuate the guaranty against illegal search
and seizure. Cardozo said that:
The officer might have been resisted[!], or sued
for damages or even prosecuted for oppression.
He was subject to removal 68or other discipline at
the hands of his superiors.
Why, then, did Mapp have such a "dramat64. Id. at 387-389.
65. Id. at 385.
66. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in
Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by

Police Departments,44 TEXAS L.REv. 939, 941 (1966).
67. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 19, 150 N.E. 585
(1926).

68. Id. at 586-587.
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ic" and "traumatic" effect? Why did it necessitate "creating new policies?" What
were the old policies like? Why did it necessitate retraining sessions from top to bottom? What was the old training like? What
did the commissioner mean when he said
that before Mapp his department had "followed the Defore rule"?
On behalf of the New York City Police Department as well as law enforcement in general, I
state unequivocally that every effort was directed
and is still being directed at compliance with and

implementation of Mapp . . .

69

Isn't it peculiar to talk about police "conpliance with" and "implementation of" a
remedy for a violation of a body of law the
police were supposed to be complying with
and implementing all along? Why did the
police have to make such strenuous efforts to
comply with Mapp unless they had not been
complying with the Fourth Amendment?
69. Murphy, supra n. 66, at 941.

Are comparisonswith
other countries meaningful?
Though it may be tempting to think that the
serious defects of our criminal justice system are the result of our failure to adopt
European models of investigation and trial,
it may be that the faults of our system are
better explained by such factors as our ethnic and
racial differences, the traditional lawlessness of
our people and our officials, and our insistence on
using the criminal law to combat every form of
socially disapproved

conduct ... We can no

more import our solutions than we can export our
problems. 1
Nevertheless, it is plain to judge Wilkey
that "one proof of the irrationality of the
exclusionary rule is that no other civilized
nation in the world has adopted it." "How
do all the other civilized countries control
their police?" he asks. "Why does the United States, alone, rely on the irrational exclusionary rule?"
In his reliance on comparisons with other
countries to attack the exclusionary rule,
Judge Wilkey parts company with the two
academicians he has chiefly leaned on,
Steven Schlesinger and Dallin Oaks. Schlesinger saw little point in making comparisons
between Canada and the United States. 2 He
recognized that there may be no comparable
need for the exclusionary rule in Canada
(and Western European countries) for several reasons:
1. P. Johnson, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 406, 410,
414 (1977).
2. S. Schlesinger, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

107

(App. II). New York: Marcel Dekker, 1977.

0 Their police "are simply better disciplined than their American counterparts." 3
* Canada's crime rate, "especially that of
violent crime, is substantially less than that
of the United States, thus putting less pressure on the police to deal with crimes by
illegal methods."

4

0 Canada's problem with crime is not
exacerbated by the level of racial tension
experienced in the United States. ' 5
Finally, Schlesinger noted, "it would
seem that these factors which differentiate
the Canadian law enforcement situation
from the American are likewise present in
the nations of Western Europe." 6

Legislative oversight
Some 20 years ago, Justice Jackson suggest-

ed another possible factor when he said:
I have been repeatedly impressed with the speed
and certainty with which the'slightest invasion of
British individual freedom or minority rights by
officials of the government is picked up in Parlia-

ment, not merely by the opposition, but by the
party in power, and made the subject of persistent
questioning, criticism, and sometimes rebuke.
There is no waiting on the theory that the judges
will take care of it ... [T]o transgress the rights

of the individual or the minority is bad politics.7
In the United States, I cannot say that this is so.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.

Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
Id.

R.Jackson, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF COVERNMENT 81-82. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963 (originally published in 1955 by
Harvard University Press).
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Flowing from the Mapp case is the issue of
defining probable cause to constitute a 7lawful
0
arrest and subsequent search and seizure.
Doesn't this issue flow from the Fourth
Amendment itself? Isn't that what the

Fourth Amendment is all about?
The police reaction to Mapp demonstrates
70. Id. at 943. For similar reaction to Mapp by other
law enforcement officials, see Kamisar, On the Tactics
of Police-ProsecutionOriented Critics of the Courts,49
CORNELL L.Q. 436, 440-43 (1964).

More recently, an American political scientist furnished examples of "zealous legislative oversight" of the police-of Scotland,
Sweden, West Germany and France, indicating that it is still "good politics" in many
European countries to observe civil liberties. 8 It was noted, too, that "[clivilians do
not just oversee but actually run most European police departments"; 9 that several European countries reserve hundreds of positions for lawyers who are recruited directly
into the upper ranks'°; that "European
police departments place much more emphasis on education"'"; and that some European countries actually encourage complaints against police and, not infrequently,
12
sustain them.

Canada's differences
How do
without
respect
explicit

other countries control their police
the exclusionary rule? At least with
to Canada, Professor Oaks offers
answers, 13 but his answers do not

8. Berkley, Europe and America: How the Police
Work, THE NEW RUPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1969, in A. Niederhoffer & A. Blumberg, eds., THE AMBIVALENT FORCE:
PERSPECTIVES

ON THE POLICE 51.

Hindale,

Ill:

Dryden Press, 2d ed. 1976.
9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 49.

11. Id.
12. "German

police departments

set up special

booths at public events, asking visitors to make complaints. The number of complaints against policemen
in such cities as London and Berlin far exceeds the
number filed against policemen in New York City. And

a much higher ratio of complaints is sustained, nearly
20 per cent in West Berlin." Id. at 51.

the unsoundness of the underlying premise
of Defore. Otherwise why, at a post-Mapp
training session on the law of search and
seizure, would Leonard Reisman, then the
New York City Deputy Police Commissioner in charge of legal matters, comment:
The Mapp case was a shock to us. We had to
reorganize our thinking, frankly. Before this, nobody bothered to take out search warrants. Although the U.S. Constitution requires warrants in
most cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled
[until 1961] that evidence obtained without a

demonstrate the "irrationality" of the rule in
the American setting. Rather, they indicate
why Canada may not need an exclusionary
rule, but why the United States still does.
First, "police discipline is relatively
common ... Second, police officers are occasionally prosecuted for criminal misconduct occurring in the course of their official
duties." Oaks considers a third factor perhaps most important of all: ". . . an aggrieved person's tort cause of action against
an offending police officer is a real rather
than just a theoretical remedy ... "
But he suggests that the difference is more
than simply the remedies. "[Plolice are
greatly concerned about obeying the rules
and very sensitive to and quick to be influenced by judicial criticism of their conduct,"
he writes. And Canadian prosecutors play
a different role from that of American prosecutors. A prosecutor there "will sometimes
exercise what he considers to be his teaching
function with the police by refusing to introduce evidence that he considers to have
been improperly obtained." Moreover, "Canadian prosecutors are part of the Ministry
of Justice, which has . .. command authority over most of the police organizations ... "
and channels by which to correct offensive
-Y.K.
practices.
13. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 702-03, 705-06

(1970). Canada, of course, "has no written law comparable to the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 704,
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warrant-illegally if you will-was admissible in
71
state courts. So the feeling was, why bother?

No incentive for change
As I have already indicated, critics of the
exclusionary rule have often made proposals
for effectuating the Fourth Amendment by
means other than the exclusionary rule-but
almost always as a quid pro quo for rejecting
or repealing the rule. Who has ever heard of
a police-prosecution spokesman urging-or
a law enforcement group supporting-an
effective "direct remedy" for illegal searches
and seizures in a jurisdiction which admitted illegally seized evidence? 72 Abandoning
the exclusionary rule without waiting for a
meaningful alternative (as Judge Wilkey and
Chief Justice Burger would have us do) will
not furnish an incentive for devising an
alternative, but relieve whatever pressure
there now exists for doing so.
I spoke in my earlier article of the great
symbolic value of the exclusionary rule
(pages 69-72, 83-84). Abolition of the exclusionary rule, after the long, bitter struggle to
attain it, would be even more important as a
symbol.
During the 12-year reign of Wolf, some
state judges
remained mindful of the cogent reasons for the
admission of illegally obtained evidence and
clung to the fragile hope that the very brazenness
of lawless police methods would bring on effec73
tive deterrents other than the exclusionary rule.
Their hope proved to be in vain. Wolf established the "underlying constitutional doctrine" that "the Federal Constitution, by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by state officers" 74 (though it did not require
exclusion of the resulting evidence); Irvine
warned that if the states "defaulted and
71. N.Y. TIMEs, April 28, 1965, p. 50.
72. Before the Cahan decision "[liaw enforcement
groups preferred the ambiguity of seldom-litigated
rules and had no real incentive to take the risks involved in seeking legislative action. And there was little
evidence that other groups would take the initiative to
force the police to come before the legislature." Barrett,
supra n. 56, at 592-595.
73. Traynor, supra n. 2, at 324.
74. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)
(the Court, per Stewart, J., describing Wolf).

there were no demonstrably effective deterrents to unreasonable searches and seizures
in lieu of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme
Court might yet decide that they had not
complied with 'minimal standards' of due
process." 7 5 But neither Wolf nor Irvine stimulated a single state legislature or a single
law enforcement agency to demonstrate that
the problem could be handled in other ways.
The disappointing 12 years between Wolf
and Mapp give added weight to Francis
Allen's thoughtful commentary on the Wolf
case at the time it was handed down:
This deference to local authority revealed in the
Wolf case stands in marked contrast to the position of the court in other cases arising within the
last decade involving rights 'basic to a free society.' It seems safe to assert that in no other area of
civil liberties litigation is there evidence that the
court has construed the obligations of federalism
to require so high a degree of judicial selfabnegation.
** ' [I]n no other area in the civil liberties has
the court felt justified in trusting to public protest
for protection of basic personal rights. Indeed,
since the rights of privacy are usually asserted by
those charged with crime and since the demands
of efficient law enforcement are so insistent, it
would seem that reliance on public opinion in
these cases can be less justified than in almost any
other . 76
Now Judge Wilkey asks us to believe that
the resurrection of Wolf (and evidently the
overruling of the 65-year-old Weeks case as
well) will permit "the laboratories of our 51
jurisdictions" to produce meaningful alternatives to the exclusionary rule. (Again, see
text following note 48). His ideological ally,
Chief Justice Burger, is even more optimistic. He asks us to believe that a return to the
pre-exclusionary rule days "would inspire a
surge of activity toward providing some
kind of statutory remedy for persons injured
77
by police mistakes or misconduct.And to think that Judge Wilkey (on page
232) accuses defenders of the exclusionary
rule of being "stubbornly blind to 65 years
of experience"!
E
75. Traynor, supra n. 2, at 324.
76. Allen, supra n. 47 at 11, 12-13.
77. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 501 (1976)
(dissenting).
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